I
n January 1919, two months after the Armistice of World War I, the Washington Evening Star broke some disturbing news about Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, DC, a fl agship military facility. Some severely wounded patients were wearing the same unwashed undergarments-wool pants and shirts, or "long johns"-for weeks. Walter Reed's laundry service washed only hospital-issued cotton pajamas, so patients who wished to wear the warmer wool underwear had limited options: they could send them to be cleaned at their own expense, or do the washing themselves in hospital bathtubs. According to the Star, some simply stopped wearing long johns altogether, and remained only in light pajamas in the dead of the DC winter. 1 The Army Inspector General's Department hastily conducted an investigation, collecting testimony from 45 patients with amputations who had allegedly spoken with the Star.
2 Private Samuel Ellis, a Black interviewee whose right arm was amputated, explained that he was In this article, I examine how African American soldiers and veterans experienced and shaped federally sponsored health care during and after World War I. Building on studies of the struggles of Black leaders and health care providers to win professional and public health advancement in the 1920s and 1930s, and of advocates to mobilize for health care rights in the mid20th century, I focus primarily on the experiences and activism of patients in the interwar years. Private and government correspondence, congressional testimony, and reports from Black newspapers reveal that African American soldiers and veterans communicated directly with policymakers and bureaucrats regarding unequal treatment, assuming roles as "policy actors" who viewed health and medical care as "politics by other means." In the process, they drew attention to the paradoxes inherent in expanding government entitlements in the era of Jim Crow, and helped shape a veterans' health system that emerged in the 1920s and remained in place for the following century. They also laid the groundwork for the system's precedent-setting desegregation, referred to by advocates of the time as "a shining example to the rest of the country. wearing pajamas because his long johns had disappeared after he washed them, as he put it, "with my one hand" and left them to dry. "My complaint is . . . got no way to wash my clothes and can't wring them out with one hand and there is no place to dry them in the ward." 3 Ellis made his dissatisfaction known and demanded better treatment. Eventually, he got it-or, at least, a promise of it. Following the newspaper story and investigation, Walter Reed offi cials pledged that patients could send their undergarments to be washed at a large training camp in nearby Maryland. 4 In this article, I examine how African American soldiers and veterans like Ellis shaped and experienced federally sponsored health care during and after the Great War. Building on studies of the struggles of Black leaders and health care providers to win professional and public health advancement in the 1920s and 1930s, and of health care advocacy eff orts in the mid-20th century, I focus primarily on the experiences and activism of patients. 5 Private correspondence, congressional testimony, and reports from Black newspapers reveal that African American soldiers and veterans communicated directly with policymakers and bureaucrats regarding unequal treatment, assuming roles as "policy actors" who viewed health and medical care as "politics by other means." 6 In the process, they drew attention to the paradoxes inherent in expanding government entitlements in the era of Jim Crow and helped shape a veterans' health system that emerged in the 1920s and remained in place for the following century.
7 They also laid the groundwork for the system's pathbreaking desegregation in the 1950s, referred to by advocates of the time as "a shining example to the rest of the country." 8 Historical assessments of health-based interactions between the US government and marginalized groups include stories of tragedy, triumph, and action. Scholars have shown that veterans have won federal entitlements since the nation's founding, but that African Americans who served typically had to fi ght access restrictions.
9
To be sure, state institutions, agencies, and programs have supported selective neglect and endangered lives, but their practices have also incited calls for change. The exposure of exploitive studies undertaken in the 20th century by the Public Health Service (PHS) and army, for example, led to forceful activism and helped bring about an acceptance of core public health principles, such as the necessity for informed consent.
10
The distribution of public funds, too, presented opportunities to counter prevailing injustices; the 1963 Simkins v. Cone ruling dictating that federal funding could not be used in hospitals that allowed segregation propelled advocates' ongoing fi ght for the legal desegregation of all health facilities.
11
Soldiers and veterans of the World War I era were hardly the fi rst or only group to wage battles against race-based, health-related injustices, but they were in a unique position to strike critical blows at Jim Crow's fragile façade. They had made physical sacrifi ces on behalf of their nation and had been legally guaranteed a rare privilege: the right to publicly funded hospital care. Although Black health activists had fought since at least the 1910s for access to federally sponsored, community-based public health services, military and veterans' hospitals served as powerful, visible focal points of institutionalized inequity. In the postwar years, African American leaders increasingly viewed health facilities, including those serving soldiers and veterans, as primary battlegrounds in a wider struggle to dismantle segregationone front in a larger battle for civil rights. Along with Black newspapers determined to highlight how "African Americans were being discriminated against by the war machine," they drew attention to reports of shortfalls in care, mobilizing "senses of entitlement and disillusion" to bring about precedent-setting policy change. Organizing health services for soldiers posed a distinct challenge to the US Army's offi cial policy of racial segregation, which remained in place through World War II. Some army offi cials argued that integration in hospital wards was necessary, because patients had to be "classifi ed by diseases rather than with reference to other considerations."
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THIS INSTITUTION OF TORTURE: MILITARY HOSPITALS
18 But White service members and concerned citizens, who were accustomed to segregation in military and civil institutions, balked. James Cunningham, for example, charged that he was "placed among crazy negroes as punishment" at Walter Reed Hospital.
19
A San Antonio, Texas, resident complained that, "sick soldiers of both races are mixed indiscriminately in the base hospital at Ft. Sam Houston," and suggested that, "irrespective of the record the soldiers made on foreign battlefi eld . . . the Southern Jim Crow law must be upheld."
20
In response to such arguments, Army Surgeon General William Gorgas sent a memo to army hospitals in March 1918, declaring that, "it would be . . . in the best interest of all concerned, to arrange for the care of white and colored patients in separate wards or separate rooms, so far as possible."
21 Well after Gorgas's communication, practices fl uctuated from institution to institution in an "imperfectly segregated" military, but the articulated policy demonstrated the extent to which the army was willing to prioritize the social concerns of White patients and advocates, even if doing so might threaten the well-being of Black patients.
22
African Americans perceived hostile conditions as an indication that the government was shirking its obligations. In the fall of 1918, two Black soldiers reported that a fellow African American patient was "unmercifully beaten up . . . because he would not give up his place" in the mess hall line. One of the soldiers who issued the complaint, the newspaper reported, "was so downhearted that he actually shed tears," disappointed in a "government that cannot protect its own soldiers from the 'crackers,' as he phrased it."
23 The Chicago Defender later referred to such complaints as "obvious example(s) of a country's crime against a race that has always shed its blood that this nation might occupy the exalted place in the world of today which it now does." 24 Using that rationale, wounded and ill African American soldiers took a stand for better treatment. Among them was Nebraska National Guard Sergeant Greenleaf B. Johnson, who was recovering from a grenade wound to the abdomen at Walter Reed in the months following the war. variety of ailments-contagious diseases, amputations, woundswere placed as punishment for disciplinary infractions. He was subjected to such treatment, he believed, because he left the hospital to see his ailing sister, in spite of army offi cials' denial of his request for leave. When one legislator questioned whether Johnson realized that his actions would have consequences, the soldier replied, "I weighed it carefully . . . it was a deliberate act." He maintained that White soldiers, too, were subject to harsh treatment: they had been, as he put it, "pulled out of bed and run up and down the ward when they were not able." "I do believe if a man is patriotic enough to die for a fl ag," he said, "the country ought to guarantee the protection of its laws and protect him against the criminal treatment that is practiced in Walter Reed Hospital." 26 Johnson-like Ellis, who lobbied for laundry service-was part of a larger movement of disabled service members who laid the foundation for an expansive veterans' health system by arguing that they deserved better than they were getting.
WE DESERVE THE SAME: PUBLICLY SANCTIONED CARE
As soldiers such as Johnson were discharged from military hospitals, the federal government turned to the PHS to provide care. 27 In 1917, that agency oversaw 19 hospitals and 119 relief stations, where benefi ciariesmainly traveling merchant seamen-commonly received treatment for tuberculosis, infl uenza, smallpox, bronchitis, rheumatism, and sexually transmitted infections. 28 Overwhelmed by the infl ux of thousands of service members from military hospitals, PHS Surgeon General Rupert Blue worriedly told federal offi cials that his organization had fi lled many of its facilities "to over fl owing, by placing beds in hallways, on verandas, and even in tents scattered about the reservations. . . ." 29 In the early months of the war, there were 1500 inpatients in PHS hospitals across the country. 30 As of February 1920, the number had ballooned to slightly more than 11 800. 31 By that point, Congress had autho rized the agency to assume control over a variety of facilities-some army hospitals that were to be renovated and other, newly built institutions. In June 1920, the PHS was operating 52 of its own hospitals containing more than 11 000 beds, and contracting with approximately 1900 private, state, and military facilities that off ered about 27 000 beds.
32 All told, between June 1919 and June 1920, there were about 49 000 admissions of veterans to hospitals throughout the country. 33 Most were for long-term illnesses like tuberculosis and "neuropsychiatric" conditions. 34 In a hospital system that relied largely on contract institutions, federal offi cials were disturbed that standards of care across the board were neither uniform nor high, but they proved willing to subject patients of color to the poorest conditions. In February 1921, Walter L. Treadway, chief of the NeuroPsychiatric Division of the PHS, assessed the Central State Hospital in Nashville, Tennessee. He qualifi ed his general statement that the contracted facility was "not suffi ciently equipped or staff ed . . . for the treatment of benefi ciaries" by suggesting that it could be suitable for the "care of all colored insane residents" in the district provided that "certain principles in respect to personnel" were observed, including the provision of a minimum number of doctors and nurses. 41 In that capacity, Cliff ord received telegrams and letters reporting "unjust, discriminating and cruel treatment that is accorded wounded heroes." When he attempted to organize an investigation of a discriminatory institutionCamp Logan, in Texas-he said his eff orts were "held up, it being claimed that such procedure would [lead to] trouble." Slightly more than a year after he assumed his federal post, Cliff ord resigned in frustration.
42
ROAD TO REVOLUTION: A VETERANS' HEALTH SYSTEM
It was not only African American veterans who were dissatisfi ed. In the months following the Armistice, majority White advocacy groups, government bureaucrats, and medical professionals alleged that the general hospital care program for discharged service members was neglectful and disorganized. In 1920, they urgently drew attention to the problem of "divided authority," and argued for the creation of an independent agency to foster greater coordination. Established in August 1921, the Veterans' Bureau (VB) grew into a diverse social service organization during the interwar years, administering pension, insurance, and medical care programs through a central offi ce in Washington, DC, as well as statebased regional offi ces. 43 Health care, in some respects, was unique in comparison with other entitlements. Those who favored expanding access could justify their position by focusing not only (or, in some cases, not at all) on prospective benefi ts for veterans, but also (or instead) on the goal of alleviating a potential public health crisis. In this respect, Thomas Salmon, a mental health expert who was part of a committee that helped plan the fi rst veterans' hospitals, was particularly worried about Black former service members, mainly because they were not seeking treatment at the same rates as their White counterparts. In southern districts, Salmon reported in 1921, 4.4 White veterans per 1000 entered hospitals with tuberculosis compared with 2.1 per 1000 Black veterans. The diff erence was even greater in the case of neuropsychiatric disorders: 5.1 of every 1000 Whites were admitted for hospital care, as opposed to 1.5 of every 1000 African Americans.
44 "If they did not need hospitalization, that would not make any diff erence," Salmon said, referring to Black veterans. "But somewhere [they] are a danger and they are much more liable to be a danger to white than to negro." 45 While Salmon and his colleagues agreed that Black veterans should have access to treatment, they also maintained that facilities should be segregated. They were not only worried about confrontations between patients, but also about the fact that, as one doctor suggested, White veterans "will not work where the negroes are working." So, in southern hospitals, "all the [White] patients sit on the porch and the negro does the work, which is fi ne for the negroes but bad for the white patients." "Treating them in separate institutions," a PHS offi cial suggested, "is almost a necessity." Salmon agreed: "I do not think there is any question but that they should be in separate institutions." 46 Those arguments help explain why an all-Black veterans' hospital was established in 1924 in Tuskegee, Alabama, and why other veterans' hospitals adopted the principle of "local control." The story of the genesis of Tuskegee-including contemporary debates among African American advocates as to whether it constituted a sign of equality or oppression-is recounted elsewhere. 47 Here, it is worth pointing out that fewer than one third of African Americans under the care of the VB in 1925-about 500 of 1800 patients-were being treated at the Alabama hospital. The remaining 1000-plus were scattered in other federal and civil institutions. 48 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, they were part of a system that adopted "no defi nite policy relative to the segregation of races" but "insofar as is feasible followed the custom in eff ect in the various localities in which hospitals are located." 49 As has historically been the case for other institutions-for example, health facilities supported by the Hill-Burton Act-local control of federally sponsored services initially fostered inequity-then, resistance. 50 African Americans' reports of limited access to care and discriminatory treatment in veterans' hospitals, which resembled their charges against military and PHS facilities, were again duly reported in the Black press. Thomas Albert White, who was suff ering from aftereff ects of poison gas and had tuberculosis, was forced to ride a segregated rail car from his Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, home to a veterans' hospital in Dawson Springs, Kentucky. Once he arrived, the New York Amsterdam News reported, he was "told that no negro soldiers were allowed there," then he was sent home, where he was "failing rapidly." Importantly, when the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) brought White's case to the attention of the VB, the agency's medical director was quick to reply: the bureau was arranging for the patient to be hospitalized at a sanitarium in Dayton, Ohio, he said, and was examining the situation. 52 Slemp found Suddeth's letter compelling enough to send it on to offi cials at the VB and request that they "look into the matter." A month later, Suddeth was admitted to Walter Reed Hospital. 53 Henry H. Davis, too, contacted government offi cials with complaints about his health, but he linked his plight directly to bigotry. He wrote to a congressional committee in 1923 explaining that he had lived in a tent while stationed at a camp in Maryland, and become ill. After being discharged with a clean bill of health, he sought treatment at a public clinic, then a PHS hospital, where doctors diagnosed both pulmonary tuberculosis and hookworm. He reported: "I am now helpless and pining away with the disobility [sic] of T.B. . . . [with] no way to support myself or my family." 54 Davis recounted that a doctor told him that his skin color "[kept] me from being a born citizen of U.S. States of America." That, he said, equated to a "durt y deal. I do not denie being a black man but I do want to say that the service that I rendered to the fl ag of the U.S. was just as true and onest as the whitest man the sun ever shined on." Some day, Davis said, "the negrow haters . . . will want the good will and onest service of the black man again . . . but . . . I don't think that I will ever bee able to render eny more of my service to the U.S."
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CONCLUSION
An early history of the veterans' health system characterized desegregation eff orts in the mid-1950s as a "quiet revolution" that took place at the highest levels of the bureaucracy. 56 Likewise, a 1955 report about the civil rights eff orts of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration innocuously declared that Harvey Higley, administrator of the Veterans Administration (VA), had recently "instructed the managers" of VA installations to end segregation "as soon as possible." 57 But the so-called "revolution" was hardly "quiet" from the perspective of patients and advocates who forcefully brought attention to inequality during and after World War I. When Black advocacy groups told VA offi cials in a 1946 meeting that "to accept segregation would be a backward step," they built on the legacy of individual patients who had aired their grievances in Congress, correspondence with government offi cials, and Black newspapers. 58 Patients' reports of their experiences also informed eff orts of leaders like W. Montague Cobb, chairman of the NAACP's National Health Committee, who argued in 1953 that any "segregative barrier" in VA hospitals was not only "unsound and unscientifi c," but also guaranteed an "excessive economic burden" and that "minority group patients" would receive "the inferior part of whatever care is provided." 59 By 1963, although the VA could hardly claim to administer a colorblind health system, Ebony magazine reported that it was, "government's most integrated agency." 60 Veteran-patients' claims during and after World War I help explain why it earned that status-and they illuminate dynamics of health activism and incremental policy change. During and after World War I, African American veteran-patients exhorted federal offi cials to confront the hypocrisy of calling on individuals to sacrifi ce for their nation, even while their government deemed them unworthy of the privileges that presumably followed that sacrifi ce-not to mention the minimum benefi ts of full citizenship. Their testimonies showcased the complexity of managing the health fallout of war, and how a commitment to Jim Crow undercut the administration and expansion of veterans' benefi ts. As Black men, patients such as Thomas Albert White and Solomon Suddeth were members of a stigmatized group. But their status as veterans meant they ostensibly had access to entitlements. They and other African American former service members recognized that, made powerful arguments regarding their rights, and helped sway bureaucrats and federal offi cials to change policies. Although a new veterans' health system initially supported, rather than challenged, prevailing practices regarding racial inequality, Black veterans and their supporters leveraged government resources to call those practices into question. Federal health entitlements of the World War I period served as the beginning, not the end, of a path toward social justice. 
